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Abstract
Web search technologies are fundamental tools to easily navigate through the huge amount
of information available in the Internet. One particular type of search technologies are the so-
called shopbots,o rcomparison sites. The emergence of Internet shopbots and their implications
for price competition and market eﬃciency are the focus of this paper. We develop a simple
model where a price comparison site tries to attract (possibly vertically and horizontally diﬀer-
entiated) online retailers on the one hand, and consumers on the other hand. The analysis of
the model reveals that diﬀerentiation among the products of the retailers as well as their ability
to price discriminate between on- and oﬀ-comparison-site consumers play a critical role. When
products are homogeneous, if online retailers cannot charge diﬀerent on- and oﬀ-the-comparison-
site prices, then the comparison site has incentives to charge fees so high that some ﬁrms are
excluded, which generates price dispersion and an ineﬃcient outcome. By contrast, when on-
and oﬀ-comparison-site prices can be diﬀerent, the comparison site attracts all the players to the
platform and the allocation is eﬃcient. A similar result obtains when products are horizontally
diﬀerentiated. In that case, the comparison site becomes an aggregator of product information
and no matter whether ﬁrms can price discriminate or not, the comparison site attracts all the
players to the platform and an eﬃcient outcome ensues. We argue that the lack of vertical
product diﬀerentiation may also be critical for this eﬃciency result. In fact, we show that when
quality diﬀerences are large, the comparison site may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to charge fees such that
low quality producers are excluded, thereby inducing an ineﬃcient outcome.
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Not so long ago individuals used atlases, books, magazines, newspapers, and encyclopedias to ﬁnd
content. To locate businesses and their products, it was customary to use yellow pages, directories,
newspapers, and advertisements, while family and friends were also a relevant source of information.
Nowadays things are quite diﬀerent: many individuals interested in content, a good or a service
usually conduct a ﬁrst search on the Internet.
Through the Internet individuals can easily access an immense amount of information. Handling
such a vast amount of information has become a complex task. Internet browsers constitute a ﬁrst
tool to ease the navigation experience. Thanks to the browsers, users move easily across documents
and reach a large amount of information in just a few mouse-clicks. Search technologies are a second
tool to facilitate the browsing experience. They are fundamental to navigate the Internet because
they help users locate and aggregate content closely related to what they are interested in.
Search engines like Google, Yahoo, Bing, etc. constitute one type of search technologies. These
search tools are often oﬀered at no cost for users and the placing of advertisements constitutes the
most important way through which these search engines are ﬁnanced. By taking advantage of the
keywords the user provides while searching for information, search engines can pick and deliver
targeted advertisements to the most interested audience. In this way, search engines become a
relatively precise channel through which producers and retailers can reach consumers. This raises
the search engines’ value and so their scope to extract rents from producers or retailers. The study
of the business model of search engines constitutes a fascinating research area in economics (see
e.g. Chen and He, 2006; Athey and Ellison, 2008; Spiegler and Eliaz, 2010; and Gomes, 2011).
Comparison sites, or shopping robots (shopbots) like PriceGrabber.com, Shopper.com, Google
Product Search, and Bing Shopping, are a second type of search technologies. These sites help
users ﬁnd goods or services that are sold online. For multiple online vendors, shopbots provide a
signiﬁcant amount of information including the products they sell, the prices they charge, indicators
about the quality of their services, their delivery costs as well as their payment methods. By using
shopbots, consumers can easily compare a large number of alternatives available in the market and
ultimately choose the most satisfactory one. Because they collate information from various oﬀers
relatively quickly, shopbots reduce consumer search costs considerably. Business models vary across
comparison sites. Most shopbots do not charge consumers for access to their sites and therefore
the bulk of their proﬁts is obtained via commercial relationships with the shops they list. They
get paid via subscription fees, click-through fees, or commission fees. Some comparison sites list
2sellers at no cost and get their revenue from sponsored links or sponsored ads. Finally, some charge
consumers to obtain access to its information, while ﬁrms do not pay any fees.
The emergence of Internet shopbots in the marketplace raises questions not only about the
competitiveness and eﬃciency of product markets but also about the most proﬁtable business
model. Do all types of ﬁrms have incentives to be listed in comparison sites? Why are the prices
listed in these sites dispersed, even if the advertised products are seemingly homogeneous? Do
comparison sites enhance social welfare? How much should each side of the market pay for the
services oﬀered by comparison sites? Addressing these questions will be the main focus of this
paper. We will do this within a framework where a comparison site designs its fee structure to
attract (possibly vertically and horizontally diﬀerentiated) online retailers on the one hand, and
consumers on the other hand. While analyzing our model, we will describe the received wisdom in
some detail.
The study of search engines other than comparison sites raises alternative interesting economic
questions. The economics of search engines is described in Anderson (2011). Of particular im-
portance is the management of sponsored search advertisements. This is because search engines
cannot limit themselves to just deliver consumer access to the advertiser placing the highest bid.
They must carefully manage the quality of the ads for otherwise they can lose the ability to obtain
surplus from advertisers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the way comparison
sites operate, as well as their main economic roles. We also summarize the main results obtained in
the small existing theoretical literature in economics, and discuss empirical research on the topic.
In Section 3, we present a model of a comparison site. The model is then applied to comparison
sites dealing with homogeneous products. Later we discuss the role of product diﬀerentiation,
both horizontal and vertical. Price discrimination across channels is also an important issue so we
dedicate some time to explain its role. The paper concludes with a summary of theoretical and
empirical considerations and puts forward some ideas for further research.
2 Comparison sites
Comparison sites or shopbots are electronic intermediaries that assist buyers when they search for
product and price information in the Internet. Shopbots have been operating on the Internet since
the late 1990s. Compared to other more traditional intermediary institutions, most shopbots do
not sell items themselves—instead they gather and aggregate price, product, and other relevant
3information from third-party sellers and present it to the consumers in an accessible way. By doing
this, consumers can easily compare oﬀers. Shopbots also display links to the vendors’ websites.
These links allow a buyer to quickly navigate to the site of the seller that oﬀers her the best deal.
Shopbots operate according to several diﬀerent business models. The most common is that users
can access the comparison site for free, while sellers have to pay a fee. Initially, most comparison
sites charged ﬁrms a ﬂat fee for the right to be listed. More recently, this fee usually takes the form
of a cost-per-click and is paid every time a consumer is referred to the seller’s website from the
comparison site. Most traditional shopbots, like for instance PriceGrabber.com, and Shopping.com
operate in this way. Fees typically depend on product category—current rates at PriceGrabber
range from $0.25 per click for clothing to $1.05 per click for plasma televisions. Alternatively,
the fee can be based on the execution of a transaction. This is the case of Priceﬁght.com, which
operates according to a cost-per-acquisition model. This model implies that sellers only pay a fee
if a consumer buys the product. Other fees may exist for additional services. For example, sellers
are often given the possibility to obtain priority positioning in the list after paying an extra fee.
A second business model consists of oﬀering product and price comparison services for free
to both sellers and buyers and relies on advertising as a source of revenue. Both Google Product
Search and Microsoft’s Bing Shopping are examples of comparison sites that have adopted this type
of business model. Any seller can list products in these websites by uploading and maintaining a
product data feed containing information about the product price, availability, shipping costs, etc.
A third, although less common model is to have consumers pay a membership fee to access
the comparison site, while sellers are listed for free. AngiesList.com for instance aggregates con-
sumer reviews about local service companies, which can be accessed by consumers for an annual
membership fee between $10 and $50, depending on where the consumer lives.
Early intermediation literature
Shopbots are platforms through which buyers and sellers can establish contact with one another.
In this sense, comparison sites essentially play an intermediation role. As a result, we are ﬁrst
led to the literature on intermediation, which has been a topic of interest in economics in general,
and in ﬁnance in particular. Spulber (1999), in his study of the economic role and relevance of
intermediaries, describes various value-adding roles played by intermediaries. The following aspects
are prominent: buyer and seller aggregation, lowering of search and matching costs, and facilitation
of pricing and clearing services.
In a market where buyers and sellers meet and negotiate over the terms of trade, a number of
4business risks and costs exist. Reducing such risks and costs is a key role played by intermediaries.
In terms of forgone welfare opportunities, not ﬁnding a suitable counter-party is in itself the most
costly hazard trading partners face; sometimes a trading partner is found at a cost but either
rationing occurs, or the failure to reach a satisfactory agreement takes place, in which case similar
welfare losses are realized. In all these situations, an intermediary can enter the market and reduce
the ineﬃciencies. By announcing prices publicly, and by committing to serve orders immediately,
intermediaries reduce signiﬁcantly the costs of transacting.
Intermediaries “make the market” by choosing input and output prices to maximize their proﬁts.
Market makers trade on their own account and so they are ready to buy and sell in the market
in which they operate. Provision of immediacy, which is a key aspect emphasized in the seminal
articles of Demsetz (1968) and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), distinguishes market makers from
other intermediating agents in the value chain. An example of a market maker is a supermarket
chain with suﬃcient upstream bargaining power so as to have an inﬂuence on bid and ask prices. In
ﬁnance, perhaps the most common examples of market-makers are stock exchange specialists (such
as commercial banks, investment ﬁnancial institutions, brokers, etc.). Market makers are also the
subject of study in Gehrig (1993), Yavas (1996), Stahl (1988), and Spulber (1999). Watanabe (2010)
extends the analysis by making the intermediation institution endogenous. Rust and Hall (2003)
distinguish between market-makers that post take-it-or-leave-it prices and middlemen who operate
in the over-the-counter market at prices that can be negotiated. They study the conditions under
which brokers and market-makers can coexist, and study the welfare properties of intermediated
equilibria.
Price comparison sites are similar to traditional intermediaries in that they “facilitate” trade
between online shoppers and retailers. However, what distinguishes a comparison site from a
traditional intermediary is that the latter typically buys goods or services from upstream producers
or sellers and re-sell them to consumers. Shopbots do not trade goods, but add value by aggregating
information. In that sense, shopbots are more similar to employment agencies and realtors, who
also serve the purpose of establishing a bridge between the supply and the demand side of the
market.
How can a price comparison site enter the market and survive in the long run? Do comparison
sites increase the competitiveness of product markets? Do they enhance market eﬃciency? This
paper will revolve around these three questions. Whether a comparison site can stay in business
in the long run is not, a priori, clear. The problem is that, given that retailers and consumers can
encounter each other outside the platform and conduct transactions, the search market constitutes
5a feasible outside option for the agents. In fact, a comparison site can only stay in business if
it chooses its intermediation fees carefully enough to out-compete the search market, or at least
to make intermediated search as attractive as the search market. The question is then whether a
comparison site can indeed create value for retailers and consumers.
The ﬁrst paper studying these questions is Yavas (1994). Yavas studies the match-making role
of a monopolistic intermediary in a competitive environment. He shows that the intermediary
can obtain a proﬁt by attracting high valuation sellers and low valuation buyers; the rest of the
agents trade in the decentralized market. Interestingly, relative to the market without intermediary,
buyers and sellers lower their search intensity, which can ultimately decrease matching rates and
cause a social welfare loss. Though Yavas’ analysis is compelling, most markets are populated by
ﬁrms that hold a signiﬁcant amount of market power. Since market power drives a wedge between
the market outcome and the social optimum, it cannot be ignored when modelling the interaction
between comparison sites, retailers, and consumers in real-world markets. Our work specially adds
in this direction.
Our model and results, and their relation to the literature
Our model, whose details are in Section 3, aims at understanding how comparison sites can overcome
“local” market power and emerge in the marketplace. In addition, we study whether comparison
sites enhance social welfare. “Local” market power can stem from geographical considerations, from
loyalty, or from behavioral-type of assumptions such as random-shopping or default-bias (Spiegler,
2011).
Our model is inspired from Baye and Morgan’s (2001) seminal paper. Baye and Morgan had
geographical considerations in mind when they developed their model so in their case “local” market
power arises from geographical market segmentation. From a general point of view, however, the
particular source of “local” market power is not very important. We will assume buyers opting out
of the comparison site will buy at random, and therefore this will be the main source of “local”
market power. In essence, the model we study is as follows. Suppose that in a market initially
characterized by some sort of segmentation, a price comparison site is opened up. Suppose that
the comparison site initially succeeds at attracting some of the buyers from the various consumer
segments. A comparison site this creates value for ﬁrms since a ﬁrm that advertises its product on
the comparison site can access consumers “located” in other segmented markets. This is reinforcing
in that consumers, by registering with the shopbot, can observe a number of product oﬀerings from
the advertising ﬁrms in addition to the usual one. We study the extent to which the market becomes
6centralized. We also compare the levels of welfare attained with and without a comparison site.
It turns out that product diﬀerentiation, both vertical and horizontal, as well as the possibility to
price discriminate between the centralized and the decentralized marketplaces play an important
role. We describe next the results we obtain and how they connect with earlier work.
We ﬁrst study the case where retailers sell homogeneous products. This is the case examined in
Baye and Morgan (2001). We show that a crucial issue is whether online retailers can practice price
discrimination across marketplaces or not. If price discrimination is not possible, as in Baye and
Morgan, then the platform’s manager has an incentive to raise ﬁrms’ participation fees above zero
so as to induce less than complete participation of the retailers. This results in an equilibrium with
price dispersion, which enhances the gains users obtain from registering with the shopbot. Although
establishing a price comparison site is welfare improving, the equilibrium is not eﬃcient because
prices are above marginal costs and the comparison site only attracts a share of the transactions.
We show that the market outcome is quite diﬀerent when retailers can price discriminate across
marketplaces, that is, when they are allowed to advertise on the price comparison site a price
diﬀerent from the one they charge in their websites. In that case, the utility consumers derive from
buying randomly, which is the outside option of consumers, is signiﬁcantly reduced and the price
comparison site can choose its tariﬀs such that both consumers and ﬁrms fully participate, while
still extracting all rents from the market. This means that with price discrimination the market
allocation is eﬃcient and all trade is centralized.
We then move to study the case in which retailers sell horizontally diﬀerentiated products. This
case was examined by Galeotti and Moraga-Gonz´ alez (2009). We employ here the random utility
framework that gives rise to logit demands. In such a model, we show that the price comparison
site can choose fees that fully internalize the network externalities present in the market. These
fees attract all ﬁrms to the platform, which maximizes the quality of the matches consumers obtain
and thereby the overall economic rents. The market allocation is not fully eﬃcient because product
sellers have market power. However, the monopolist intermediary does not introduce distortions
over and above those arising from the market power of the diﬀerentiated product sellers. The
fact that the comparison site attracts all retailers and buyers to the platform does not depend on
whether the retailers can price discriminate across marketplaces or not. This result stems from
the aggregation role played by the (product and price) comparison site. By luring ﬁrms into the
platform not only price competition is fostered so consumers beneﬁt from lower prices but also
more choice is oﬀered to consumers. Since the comparison site becomes an aggregator of variety,
the comparison site becomes a marketplace more attractive for the buyers than the search market.
7In our last model, we allow for vertical product diﬀerentiation in addition to horizontal product
diﬀerentiation. The main result we obtain is that the nature of the pricing policy of the comparison
site can change signiﬁcantly, and produce an ineﬃcient outcome. Note that when quality diﬀerences
across retailers are absent, the comparison site obtains the bulk of its proﬁts from the buyers. By
lowering the fees charged to the ﬁrms, more value is created at the platform for consumers and this
value is in turn extracted by the comparison site via consumer fees. We show that when quality
diﬀerences are large, the comparison site may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to do otherwise by charging ﬁrm fees
suﬃciently high so as to prevent low quality producers from participating in the comparison site.
This raises the rents of the high quality sellers, and at the same time creates value for consumers.
These rents are in turn extracted by the comparison site via ﬁrm and consumer participation fees.
In this equilibrium, the intermediary produces a market allocation that is ineﬃcient.
Empirical literature
Empirical studies centered around shopbots have focused on distinct issues. A number of these
studies look at whether predictions derived from the theoretical comparison site models are in line
with the data. Using micro data on individual insurance policies, Brown and Goolsbee (2002)
provide empirical evidence that increased usage of comparison sites signiﬁcantly reduced the price
of term life insurance in the 1990s, while prices did not fall with increased Internet usage in the
period before these comparison sites began. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2001) use click-through data
to analyze behavior of consumers searching for books on Dealtime.com. They ﬁnd that shopbot
consumers put substantial brand value on the biggest three retailers (Amazon, Barnes and Noble,
and Borders), which suggests it is indeed important to model product diﬀerentiation. Baye, Morgan
and Scholten (2004) analyze more than four million price observations from Shopper.com and ﬁnd
that price dispersion is quite persistent in spite of the increased usage of comparison sites. Baye,
Gatti, Kattuman, and Morgan (2006) look at how the introduction of the Euro aﬀected prices and
price dispersion using data from Kelkoo, a large comparison site in the European Union. They ﬁnd
price patterns broadly consistent with predictions from comparison site models.
More recently, Moraga-Gonz´ alez and Wildenbeest (2008) estimate a model of search using price
data for memory chips obtained from the comparison site MySimon.com. Their estimates can be
interpreted so as to suggest that consumer participation rates are relatively low –between 4% and
13% of the consumers use the search engine. They ﬁnd signiﬁcant price dispersion. An, Baye, Hu,
Morgan, and Shum (2010) structurally estimate a model of a comparison site using British data
from Kelkoo and use the estimates to simulate the competitive eﬀects of horizontal mergers.
8Finally, some papers use data from comparison sites to estimate demand models. Ellison and
Ellison (2009) study competition between sellers in a market in which the comparison site Price-
watch.com played a dominant role and, using sales data for one of the retailers, ﬁnd that demand
is tremendously price sensitive for the lowest quality memory modules. In addition Ellison and El-
lison ﬁnd evidence that sellers are using obfuscation strategies, with less elastic demand for higher
quality items as a result. Koulayev (2010) estimates demand and search costs in a discrete choice
product diﬀerentiation model using click-through data for hotel searches on Kayak.com, and ﬁnds
that search frictions have a signiﬁcant impact on demand elasticity estimates.
3 A model of a comparison site
We study a model of a comparison site where subscribing consumers can compare the prices charged
by the diﬀerent advertising retailers and the characteristics of their products. A comparison site has
therefore the features of a two-sided market. Two-sided markets are characterized by the existence
of two groups of agents which derive gains from conducting transactions with one another, and the
existence of intermediaries that facilitate these transactions. Exhibitions, employment agencies,
videogame platforms, Internet portals, dating agencies, magazines, newspapers and journals are
other examples of two-sided markets (see Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Evans,
2003; and Rochet and Tirole, 2003).1
In our model the comparison site is controlled by a monopolist. One group of users consists of
ﬁrms selling products and the other group of users is made of consumers. From the point of view
of a ﬁrm, participating in the comparison site is a way to exhibit its product and post its price to
a potentially larger audience. An individual ﬁrm that does not advertise on the comparison site
limits itself to selling to those customers who remain outside the platform. Likewise, for a consumer,
visiting the platform is a way to learn the characteristics and the prices of all the products of the
participating ﬁrms. A consumer who does not register with the comparison site can only trade
outside the platform. We will assume consumers who opt out of the platform randomly visit a
ﬁrm.2
The monopoly platform sets participation fees for consumers and ﬁrms to attract business to
the platform. Traditionally, comparison sites have used ﬁxed advertising fees, or ﬂat fees, paid by
1Weyl (2010) presents a general model. The literature on two-sided markets has typically focused on situations
where network eﬀects are mainly across sides. As we will see later, for proﬁt-making of comparison sites, managing
the externalities within retailers is of paramount importance.
2Alternatively, and without aﬀecting the results qualitatively, these consumers can be seen as buying from a
“local” ﬁrm, or from a ﬁrm to which they are loyal.
9ﬁrms that participate. For the moment we shall assume other fees, like per-click or per-transaction
fees, are equal to zero.3 Let a denote the (ﬁxed) fee the platform charges ﬁrms for participation.
While the platform can charge diﬀerent fees to ﬁrms and consumers, we assume the platform cannot
price discriminate among ﬁrms by charging them diﬀerent participation fees. Likewise, let s denote
the fee charged to consumers for registering with the platform. For simplicity, assume the platform
incurs no cost.
On the supply side of the market, there are two possibly vertically and horizontally diﬀerentiated
retailers competing in prices. Let us normalize their unit production cost to zero. A retailer may
decide to advertise its product and price on the platform (A) or not to advertise it at all (NA).
Advertising may involve certain cost k associated to the feeding up product and price information
into the comparison site. For the moment, we will ignore this cost. Let Ei = {A,NA} be the set
of advertising strategies available to a ﬁrm i.Aﬁ r mi’s participation strategy is then a probability
function over the set Ei. We refer to αi as the probability with which a ﬁrm i chooses A, while
1−αi denotes the probability with which such a ﬁrm chooses NA.Aﬁ r mi’s pricing strategy on the
platform is a price (distribution) Fi. The ﬁrm may charge a diﬀerent price (distribution), denoted
Fio, to the consumers who show up at the shop directly.4 A strategy for ﬁrm i is thus denoted by
σi = {αi,F i,F io},i=1 ,2. The strategies of both ﬁrms are denoted by σ and the (expected) payoﬀ
to a ﬁrm i given the strategy proﬁle σ is denoted πi(σ).
There is a unit mass of consumers. Consumers can either pick a ﬁrm at random and buy
there, or else subscribe to the platform, view the oﬀerings of the advertising ﬁrms and buy the
most attractive one. We assume that consumers are distributed uniformly across ﬁrms so each
ﬁrm receives half of the non-subscribing consumers. Those buyers who choose not to register with
the platform visit a retailer at random and buy there at the price pio. If they participate in the
centralized market, they see all the products available and choose the one that matches them best.
To keep things simple, we assume that a consumer who registers with the platform cannot trade
outside the platform within the current trading period, even if she ﬁnds no suitable product in the
platform.
3Later in the paper, we show that our main results hold when per-click fees are used. As mentioned in the
Introduction, some comparison sites may obtain the bulk of their revenue from the selling of advertising space
instead. This alternative business model is considered elsewhere in this volume.
4In this paper we will allow for price discrimination across, but not within, marketplaces. That is, the ﬁrms may
be able to post on the price comparison site a price diﬀerent from the one they charge to local/loyal consumers.
Things are diﬀerent when retailers can price discriminate across loyal consumers. This is often the case in over-the-
counter (OTC) markets, where the bargaining institution is predominant. For a model that studies the role of price
discrimination over-the-counter in a two-sided market setting see Van Eijkel (2011).
10Consumer m’s willingness to pay for the good sold by ﬁrm i is
uim = δi + εim.
The parameter εim is assumed to be independently and identically double exponentially distributed
across consumers and products with zero mean and unit variance and can be interpreted as a match
parameter that measures the quality of the match between consumer i and product m. We assume
there is an outside option with u0 = ε0m.L e t G and g denote the cumulative and probability
distribution functions of εim, respectively.5 A buyer demands a maximum of one unit. To allow for
vertical product diﬀerentiation, let Δ ≡ δ1 − δ2 > 0 be the (ex-ante) quality diﬀerential between
the two products. Ex-ante, consumers do not know which ﬁrm sells which quality; like match
values, the quality of a particular ﬁrm is only known after consumers visit such ﬁrm. Buyers may
decide to register with the platform (S) or not at all (NS). The set of consumers’ pure strategies
is denoted R = {S,NS}. A consumer’s mixed strategy is a probability function over the set R.
We refer to μ ∈ [0,1] as the probability with which a consumer registers with the platform. Given
all other agents’ strategies, u(μ) denotes the (expected) utility of a consumer who subscribes with
probability μ.
The timing of moves is the following. In the ﬁrst stage, the comparison site chooses the par-
ticipation fees. In the second stage, ﬁrms simultaneously decide on their participation and pricing
decisions, while consumers decide whether to register with the platform or not. Firms and con-
sumers that do not enter the platform can only conduct transactions when they match in the
decentralized market; likewise, consumers who register with the comparison site can only conduct
transactions there. The market clears when transactions between ﬁrms and consumers take place.
We study subgame perfect equilibria.6
3.1 Homogeneous products
It is convenient to start by assuming that ﬁrms sell homogeneous products. Therefore, we assume
that εim =0f o ra l li,m, including the outside option, and that δi = δj. As a result, uim = δ for
all i and m. This is the case analyzed in the seminal contribution of Baye and Morgan (2001).7 In
5Matching values are realized only after consumers visit the platform or the individual shops. This implies that
ex-ante all consumers are identical. This modelling seems to be appropriate when ﬁrms sell newly introduced products.
6It is well known that in models with network externalities multiple equilibria can exist. In our model there is
always an equilibrium where no agent uses the comparison site. This equilibrium is uninteresting and will therefore
be ignored.
7To be sure, the model of Baye and Morgan (2001) is more general because they study the N-retailers case and
because consumers have elastic demands. In addition, for later use, we have assumed that consumers who register
11what follows, we will only sketch the procedure to derive a SPE. For details, we refer the reader to
the original contribution of Baye and Morgan.
Let us proceed backwards and suppose that the participation fees a and s are such that ﬁrms
and consumers are indiﬀerent between participating in the price comparison site or not. Recall
that μ denotes the fraction of participating consumers and α the probability with which a ﬁrm
advertises its price on the platform. To allow for mixed pricing strategies, refer to F(p)a st h e
advertised price.
Consider a ﬁrm that does not advertise at the price comparison site. This ﬁrm will only sell
t oaf r a c t i o n( 1− μ)/2 of non-participating consumers and therefore it is optimal for this ﬁrm to
charge the monopoly price δ. As a result, a ﬁrm that does not advertise at the price comparison






Consider now a ﬁrm that decides to charge a price p and advertise it at the price comparison
site. This ﬁrm will sell to a fraction (1 − μ)/2 of non-participating consumers as well as to the
participating consumers if the rival either does not advertise or advertises a higher price. Therefore,








1 − α + α(1 − F(p))

− a.
It is easy to see that for advertising fees 0 ≤ a<μ δan equilibrium in pure advertising strategies
does not exist. In fact, if the rival ﬁrm did not advertise for sure, then ﬁrm i would obtain a
proﬁt equal to (1 − μ)δ/2 if it did not advertise either, while if it did advertise a price just below
δ, this ﬁrm would obtain a proﬁt equal to ((1 − μ)/2+μ)δ − a. Likewise, an equilibrium where
ﬁrms advertise with probability 1 does not exist either if a>0. If the two ﬁrms advertised with
probability 1, the price comparison site would resemble a standard Bertrand market so both ﬁrms
would charge a price equal to the marginal cost and then ﬁrms would not obtain suﬃcient proﬁts
to cover the advertising fees. Therefore an equilibrium must have α ∈ (0,1).





with the platform cannot visit the local shop any longer. The results do not depend on this assumption and we will
also make it here for overall consistency of our paper.
8For the moment, we are ignoring the possibility ﬁrms advertise on the platform a price diﬀerent from the one
they charge to the non-participating consumers.
12These conditions tell us that (i) a ﬁrm must be indiﬀerent between advertising and not advertising
(ﬁrst equality) and also that (ii) a ﬁrm that advertises the monopoly price on the platform gets
the same proﬁts that a ﬁrm that advertises any other price in the support of the price distribution
(second equality). Setting the condition πi(0,δ;σ∗
−i)=πi(1,δ;σ∗
−i) and solving for α gives the




Using the condition πi(0,δ;σ∗
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The lower bound of the equilibrium price distribution is found by setting F∗(p) = 0 and solving for
p, which gives p = δ − 2α∗δμ/(1 + μ).
We now turn to the users’ side of the market. Users take as given ﬁrms’ behavior so they believe
ﬁrms to advertise with probability α∗ a price drawn from the support of F∗. A user who registers
with the platform encounters two prices in the price comparison site with probability α∗2,i nw h i c h
case she picks the lowest one; with probability 2α∗(1−α∗) there is just one price advertised on the
platform. The expected utility to a user who registers with the price comparison site is then
u(1) = α∗2(δ − E[min{p1,p 2}]) + 2α∗(1 − α∗)(δ − E[p]) − s,
where E[min{p1,p 2}]=
 δ
p 2p(1−F(p))f(p)dp and E[p]=
 δ
p pf(p)dp. A user who does not register
with the price comparison site always buys from one of the ﬁrms at random so her utility will be
equal to zero if the chosen ﬁrm does not advertise, while it will be equal to δ − E[p] otherwise.
Therefore,
u(0) = α∗(δ − E[p]).
As a result, for given advertising and subscription fees, we may have two types of market equilibria.
One is when users participate surely. In that case, users must derive a strictly positive utility from
subscribing. The other is when users’ participation rate is less than one. In that case, they must
be indiﬀerent between participating and not participating so μ must solve the following equation
u(1) = u(0).
13Whether one equilibrium prevails over the other is a matter of expectations: if ﬁrms expect users
to be pretty active then it is optimal for consumers to do so, and vice-versa.
We now fold the game backwards and consider the stage of the game where the manager of the
price comparison site chooses the pair of advertising and subscription fees {a,s} to maximize its
proﬁts. The proﬁts of the intermediary are:
Π(a,s)=2 α∗a + μ∗s. (1)
as E [p] E[minp1,p 2] αμπ i u∗ Π
0.500 0.010 0.933 0.912 0.170 0.602 0.199 0.011 0.176
0.500 0.020 0.899 0.868 0.238 0.656 0.172 0.024 0.251
0.500 0.030 0.870 0.831 0.289 0.703 0.148 0.038 0.310
0.550 0.030 0.867 0.827 0.281 0.765 0.118 0.037 0.332
0.600 0.030 0.864 0.824 0.274 0.826 0.087 0.037 0.353
0.650 0.030 0.862 0.821 0.268 0.887 0.056 0.037 0.374
0.650 0.040 0.834 0.785 0.307 0.938 0.031 0.051 0.437
0.650 0.050 0.807 0.751 0.342 0.988 0.006 0.066 0.494
0.650 0.053 0.800 0.743 0.350 1.000 0.000 0.070 0.508
Notes: The quality parameter δ is set to 1.
Table 1: Homogeneous products: comparison site’s proﬁts increase in consumer fee s
We now argue that a SPE with partial ﬁrm and user participation cannot be sustained. Suppose
that at the equilibrium fees a and s, we have a continuation game equilibrium with α∗,μ ∗ < 1.
Then, the participation rate of the users μ∗ is given by the solution to u(1) = u(0) and the
participation rate of the ﬁrms α∗ =1− a/δμ∗. Table 1 shows that the intermediary’s proﬁts
increase monotonically in s. The idea is that in this continuation equilibrium the elasticity of user
demand for participation in the price comparison site is strictly positive. In the putative equilibrium
u(1) = u(0). Keeping everything else ﬁxed, an increase in s makes utility outside the platform lower
than inside the platform. To restore equilibrium ﬁrms must advertise more frequently, which can
only occur if the fraction of subscribing consumers increases. So an increase in s is accompanied
by an increase in the participation rates of both retailers and users, as it can be seen in the table.
This clearly shows than in SPE it must be the case that μ =1 .




{2α∗a + s} s.t. u(1) ≥ u(0).
Table 2 shows the solution of this problem for δ = 1. The proﬁts of the intermediary are maximized
when a =0 .426 and s =0 .119 (in bold) so in SPE user participation is maximized but ﬁrm
participation is not. The intuition for this result is clear. If the ﬁrms did participate surely, then
14as E [p] E[minp1,p 2] αμπ i u∗ Π
0.100 0.140 0.256 0.165 0.900 1.000 0.000 0.670 0.320
0.200 0.162 0.402 0.299 0.800 1.000 0.000 0.478 0.482
0.300 0.151 0.516 0.415 0.700 1.000 0.000 0.339 0.571
0.400 0.127 0.611 0.519 0.600 1.000 0.000 0.233 0.607
0.426 0.119 0.633 0.544 0.574 1.000 0.000 0.210 0.608
0.450 0.111 0.653 0.567 0.550 1.000 0.000 0.191 0.607
0.500 0.097 0.693 0.614 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.153 0.597
0.600 0.066 0.766 0.701 0.400 1.000 0.000 0.094 0.546
0.700 0.040 0.832 0.783 0.300 1.000 0.000 0.050 0.460
Notes: The quality parameter δ is set to 1.
Table 2: Homogeneous products model: maximum proﬁts intermediary
the price advertised on the platform would be equal to the marginal cost and the ﬁrms would not
make any money. In such a case the bulk of the proﬁts of the price comparison site would have to
be extracted from the consumers. However, in the absence of price dispersion no consumer would
be willing to pay anything to register with the platform. To summarize, the key insights from Baye
and Morgan (2001) are that the proﬁts of the price comparison site are maximized when consumers
participate with probability one but ﬁrms do not, in this way creating price dispersion and so
subscription value for consumers. As we have mentioned above, price dispersion is ubiquitous
also on the Internet (Baye, Morgan and Scholten, 2004) and, moreover, it is diﬃcult to reject
the null hypothesis that advertised prices on comparison sites are random (Moraga-Gonz´ alez and
Wildenbeest, 2008).
The role of price discrimination across marketplaces
In Baye and Morgan (2001) price comparison sites have incentives to create price dispersion since
by doing so they create value for consumers. If prices on- and oﬀ-platform are similar, consumers
are not interested in the platform services so the bulk of the money has to be made on the ﬁrms’
side. By raising ﬁrms participation fees, a price comparison site achieves two objectives at once. On
the one hand, competition between ﬁrms is weakened and this increases the possibility to extract
rents from the ﬁrm side; on the other hand, price dispersion goes up and this in turn increases the
possibility to extract rents from the user side of the market. This interesting result is intimately
related to the assumption that online retailers cannot price discriminate across marketplaces. To
see this, suppose that a ﬁrm could set a price at its own website which is diﬀerent from the one
advertised on the platform. Since consumers who do not register with the platform are assumed to
pick a website at random, it is then obvious that the website’s price would be equal to δ.Aﬁ r m
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Now we argue that, to maximize proﬁts, the price comparison site wishes to induce full participation
of ﬁrms and consumers, thereby maximizing social welfare and extracting all the surplus. The
expected utility to a user who registers with the price comparison site is given by the same expression
for u(1) above, i.e., u(1) = α∗2(δ − E[min{p1,p 2}]) + 2α∗(1 − α∗)(δ − E[p]) − s. A user who does
not register with the price comparison site buys at the price δ so her utility will be u(0) = 0.
Consider now the stage of the game where the price comparison site’s manager chooses ﬁrm and
consumer participation fees. Suppose that at the equilibrium fees ﬁrms and consumers mix between
participating and not participating. Table 3 shows that the elasticity of consumer participation is
also positive in this case. As a result, the intermediary will continue to raise the user fees until all
consumers participate with probability one.
as E [p] E[minp1,p 2] αμπ i u∗ Π
0.500 0.010 0.948 0.932 0.100 0.556 0.222 0.000 0.106
0.500 0.025 0.916 0.890 0.158 0.594 0.203 0.000 0.173
0.500 0.050 0.879 0.842 0.224 0.644 0.188 0.000 0.256
0.550 0.050 0.879 0.842 0.224 0.708 0.146 0.000 0.281
0.600 0.050 0.879 0.842 0.224 0.773 0.114 0.000 0.307
0.650 0.050 0.879 0.842 0.224 0.837 0.081 0.000 0.333
0.650 0.075 0.849 0.803 0.274 0.895 0.052 0.000 0.423
0.650 0.100 0.822 0.770 0.316 0.951 0.025 0.000 0.506
0.650 0.123 0.800 0.743 0.350 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.508
Notes: The quality parameter δ is set to 1.
Table 3: Homogeneous products with price discrimination: intermediary’s proﬁts increase in s
In Table 4 we show that the price comparison site’s proﬁts increase by lowering the ﬁrms fee
and increasing the users charge until they reach 0 and 1 respectively, which implies that all ﬁrms
and consumers participate with probability one. In that case, product prices are driven down to
16marginal cost and the bulk of the proﬁts of the intermediary is obtained from the consumers.
as E [p] E[minp1,p 2] αμπ i u∗ Π
0.750 0.063 0.863 0.822 0.250 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.438
0.650 0.123 0.800 0.743 0.350 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.508
0.500 0.250 0.693 0.614 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.750
0.250 0.563 0.462 0.359 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.938
0.100 0.810 0.256 0.166 0.900 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.990
0.010 0.980 0.047 0.019 0.990 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
0.001 0.998 0.007 0.002 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Notes: The quality parameter δ is set to 1.
Table 4: Homogeneous products model with price discrimination: intermediary’s maximum proﬁts
Notice that with price discrimination, the market allocation is eﬃcient. The intuition is the
following. By increasing competition in the platform, prices go down and more surplus is generated
for consumers. This surplus, since buyers have in practice no outside option, can be extracted from
consumers via participation fees. Interestingly, the fact that ﬁrms can price discriminate eliminates
the surplus consumers obtain by opting out of the price comparison site and this ultimately destroys
the proﬁts of the retailers.
Click-through fees
In recent years many comparison sites have replaced the ﬁxed-fees by a cost-per-click (CPC) tariﬀ
structure. In this subsection we show that the CPC business model does not alter the main insights
we have obtained so far.9 Let c be the click-through fee. Assume also that there still exists a (small)
ﬁxed cost a ﬁrm has to pay for advertising on the platform, denoted k, which can be interpreted
as a hassle cost for feeding up the comparison site information system. The proﬁts of a ﬁrm that
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− k.
The ﬁrst part of this proﬁts expression comes from the consumers who do not register with the
platform and buy at random. The second part comes from the consumers who participate in the
comparison site. These consumes click on ﬁrm i’s oﬀer when ﬁrm i is the only advertising ﬁrm,
which occurs with probability 1 − α,o rw h e nﬁ r mj also participates at the clearinghouse but
advertises a higher price than ﬁrm i, which occurs with probability α(1 − F(p)).
9One reason why CPC tariﬀs may recently have become more widely used is that they involve less risk for the
platform. An, Baye, Hu, Morgan, and Shum (2010) also allow for a click-trough fee in a Baye and Morgan (2001)
type model, but do not model the optimal fee structure of the comparison site.
17Using the condition πi(0,δ;σ∗
−i)=πi(1,δ;σ∗





If μ consumers participate in the platform, the total expected number of clicks is then μ(1 − (1 −
α∗)2). Using the condition πi(1,p;σ∗
−i)=πi(1,δ;σ∗













The decision of consumers does not change—they participate with a probability μ∗,w h i c hi st h e
solution to u(1) = u(0). The proﬁts of the intermediary are then
Π(c,s)=μ∗s + μ∗(1 − (1 − α∗)2)c
Table 5 shows that the property that the elasticity of the consumer demand for participation
is positive still holds. As a result, the platform will increase s until all consumers register with the
price comparison site.
kcs E [p] E[minp1,p 2] αμπ i u∗ Π
0.200 0.500 0.010 0.952 0.938 0.255 0.537 0.231 0.012 0.125
0.200 0.500 0.020 0.925 0.903 0.355 0.620 0.190 0.027 0.193
0.200 0.500 0.030 0.899 0.870 0.428 0.700 0.150 0.043 0.257
0.200 0.550 0.030 0.900 0.872 0.436 0.788 0.106 0.044 0.319
0.200 0.600 0.030 0.900 0.873 0.445 0.901 0.050 0.044 0.401
0.200 0.600 0.033 0.892 0.864 0.465 0.935 0.033 0.050 0.431
0.200 0.600 0.036 0.884 0.854 0.484 0.969 0.015 0.056 0.462
0.200 0.600 0.039 0.877 0.846 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.061 0.488
Notes: The quality parameter δ is set to 1.
Table 5: Homogeneous products model with CPC: platform’s proﬁts increase in consumer fees
Given this observation, to maximize the proﬁts of the comparison site we need to solve
max
c {s +( 1− (1 − α∗)2)c} s.t. u(1) ≥ u(0).
Table 6 shows the solution of this problem for δ = 1 and k =0 .2. The proﬁts of the intermediary are
maximized when c =0 .563 so again in SPE user participation is maximized but ﬁrm participation
is not. The intuition for this result is the same as above.
18kcs E [p] E[minp1,p 2] αμπ i u∗ Π
0.200 0.100 0.145 0.487 0.393 0.778 1.000 0.000 0.399 0.240
0.200 0.200 0.127 0.570 0.487 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.323 0.315
0.200 0.300 0.108 0.651 0.579 0.714 1.000 0.000 0.249 0.383
0.200 0.400 0.086 0.730 0.670 0.667 1.000 0.000 0.180 0.442
0.200 0.500 0.063 0.805 0.759 0.600 1.000 0.000 0.117 0.483
0.200 0.563 0.048 0.851 0.814 0.542 1.000 0.000 0.081 0.493
0.200 0.600 0.039 0.877 0.845 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.061 0.489
0.200 0.700 0.014 0.943 0.927 0.333 1.000 0.000 0.019 0.403
Notes: The quality parameter δ is set to 1.
Table 6: Homogeneous products model with CPC: intermediary’s maximum proﬁts
3.2 Diﬀerentiated products
We continue with the case in which ﬁrms sell products that are both horizontally and vertically
diﬀerentiated. Galeotti and Moraga-Gonz´ alez (2009) study a similar model, but without vertical
product diﬀerentiation, that is, δi = δ for all i, and with match values uniformly distributed. Here
we explore the role of vertical product diﬀerentiation and we choose to work with logit demands
for convenience. Later, we shall see the relationship between these two models.
Recall that μ is the proportion of consumers in the market registering with the comparison site
and that αi is the probability ﬁrm i advertises her product at the comparison site. We ﬁrst look
at the price set by a ﬁrm that does not advertise at the comparison site. Denoting by pio such a
price, it should be chosen to maximize the proﬁts a ﬁrm obtains from the consumers who visit a











1+e x p ( δi − pio)
, (2)
Let p∗
io denote the monopoly price of ﬁrm i,a n dπ∗
i (0,p ∗
io) the proﬁts this ﬁrm obtains if it does
not advertise. Taking the ﬁrst-order condition of equation (2) with respect to pio and solving for
pio gives
p∗
io =1+W[exp(δi − 1)],
where W[exp(δi − 1)] is the Lambert W-Function evaluated at exp(δi − 1), i.e., the W that solves
exp(δi − 1) = W exp(W).
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where αj is the probability the rival ﬁrm advertises at the comparison site. As can be seen from
this equation, demand depends on whether or not the rival ﬁrm advertises. With probability αj
seller i competes with seller j for the proportion μ of consumers visiting the comparison site, which
means that in order to make a sale the utility oﬀered by ﬁrm i needs to be larger than the utility
oﬀered by ﬁrm j as well as the outside good. Since we are assuming εim is i.i.d. type I extreme
value distributed this happens with probability exp(δi − pi)/(1 +

k=i,j exp(δk − pk)). Similarly,
with probability (1 − αj) seller i is the only ﬁrm competing on the platform, which means ui only
has to be larger than u0 for ﬁrm i to gain these consumers, i.e., exp(δi − pi)/(1 + exp(δi − pi)).
Finally, a proportion (1−μ)/2 of consumers buy at random, and the probability of selling to these
consumers is exp(δi − pi)/(1 + exp(δi − pi)).
The expression for the proﬁts of ﬁrm j is similar. Taking the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect
to pi and pj yields a system of equations that characterizes the equilibrium prices. Unfortunately
it is diﬃcult to derive a closed-form expression for these prices. Figure 1(a), however, shows for
selected parameter values that the equilibrium price of ﬁrm i decreases in αj.10 Intuitively, as αj
increases, the probability a ﬁrm meets a competitor at the comparison site goes up and this fosters
competition. As shown in Figure 1(b) the proﬁts of ﬁrm i also decrease in αj.
We now study the behavior of consumers in the market. If a user does not register with the




















(1 − αj)log[1 + exp(δj − pjo)] +
1
2
αj log[1 + exp(δj − pj)] + γ. (3)
10The parameter values used in Figure 1 are μi = μj =1 ,αi =1 ,δi =1 ,a n dδj =0 .
20(a) Prices pi,p j and participation seller j (b) Proﬁts πi,π j and participation seller j
Figure 1: Prices and proﬁts as function of participation seller j
where γ is Euler’s constant. The utility a consumer obtains when remaining unregistered with the
comparison site should increase in αi and αj because of the increased competition in the comparison
site. If a user registers with the intermediary, her expected utility is
u∗(1) = αiαjE[max{ui,u j,u 0}]+αi(1 − αj)E[max{ui,u 0}]+αj(1 − αi)E[max{uj,u 0}]+
(1 − αi)(1 − αj)E[u0] − s;
= αiαj log[1 + exp(δi − pi)+e x p ( δj − pj)] + αi(1 − αj)log[1 + exp(δi − pi)]
(αj(1 − αi)log[1 + exp(δj − pj)] + γ − s. (4)
Armed with these equations, we can study the continuation game equilibria. Basically, there may
be two kinds of equilibrium. An equilibrium with full consumer participation (μ∗ = 1) (and either
full or partial ﬁrm participation), or an equilibrium with partial consumer participation (μ∗ < 1)
(and either full or partial ﬁrm participation). In both types of equilibria, if the ﬁrms mix between









In the second type of equilibrium, if the users mix between participating and not participating, the
21participation probability μ∗ must be the solution to
u∗(1) = u∗(0).
In the ﬁrst stage of the game the owner of the comparison site chooses the pair of fees {a,s}
such that her proﬁts are maximized. The proﬁt of the intermediary is given by
Π=2 αiαja + αi(1 − αj)a + αj(1 − αi)a + μs. (5)
3.2.1 Horizontal product diﬀerentiation
It is convenient to ﬁrst assume products are not vertically diﬀerentiated, i.e., δi = δj = δ.T h i s
means ﬁrms are symmetric and therefore we only need to consider two participation probabilities,
α and μ. This case has been studied by Galeotti and Moraga-Gonz´ alez (2009) for the N−ﬁrm
case and a uniform distribution of match-parameters. Galeotti and Moraga-Gonz´ alez (2009) show
that in SPE the comparison site chooses ﬁrm and user fees so that ﬁrms and consumers join with
probability one. That this also holds for a double exponentially distributed match-parameter can
be seen in Table 7. The table shows that when either α or μ are less than one the proﬁts of
the intermediary can go up by increasing the fees to ﬁrms, consumers, or both. As a result, the
intermediary will set both a and s such that all agents participate, that is, α = μ =1 .
as p ∗ αμ π ∗ u∗ Π
0.050 0.100 1.552 0.681 0.108 0.253 1.030 0.079
0.050 0.150 1.550 0.752 0.110 0.252 1.031 0.092
0.050 0.200 1.547 0.825 0.113 0.251 1.032 0.105
0.050 0.313 1.541 1.000 0.121 0.249 1.036 0.138
0.100 0.313 1.518 0.993 0.242 0.215 1.044 0.274
0.200 0.313 1.477 0.982 0.487 0.146 1.059 0.545
0.400 0.313 1.412 0.963 0.980 0.006 1.083 1.078
0.400 0.300 1.405 0.989 0.992 0.002 1.088 1.119
0.401 0.337 1.401 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.090 1.139
Notes: The quality parameter δ is set to 1.
Table 7: Model with horizontal product diﬀerentiation
The intuition is similar to that in the model with homogeneous products. Suppose users mix
between registering with the comparison site and not doing so. A raise in their registration fees
makes them less prone to participate. To restore equilibrium ﬁrms should be more active in the
comparison site. A higher participation rate of the ﬁrms can then be consistent with the expectation
that consumers also participate more often. These cross-group externalities imply the increasing
shape of the proﬁts function of the comparison site in s. Therefore, the intermediary will continue
to increase s till either α =1o rμ =1 .W h e nα = 1, the table shows how an increase in the ﬁrms
22fee increases consumer participation, lowers the price as well as ﬁrm participation. Proﬁts of the
comparison site increase anyway because consumer demand for participation is more elastic than
ﬁrm demand for participation. Since an increase in a decreases ﬁrm participation, this relaxes the
α = 1 constraint and then the intermediary can increase again the consumer fee. This process
c o n t i n u e su n t i lt h ei n t e r m e d i a r ye x t r a c t sa l lt h er e n t si nt h em a r k e tu pt ot h ev a l u eo ft h eo u t s i d e
option of the agents. We note that this insight is not altered if the retailers are allowed to price
discriminate across marketplaces (see Galeotti and Moraga-Gonz´ alez, 2009).
One important assumption behind the eﬃciency result is that agents are all ex-ante symmetric.
If for example ﬁrms are ex-ante heterogeneous, a monopolist intermediary may induce a suboptimal
entry of agents into the platform (see Nocke, Peitz and Stahl, 2007).
Click-through fees
If we allow for a click-through fee c in addition to an implicit and exogenous ﬁxed cost k of
advertising at the comparison site, the expected proﬁts of a ﬁrm i are
πi(1,p i;σ∗
−i)=( pi − c)μ
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− k,
The ﬁrst part of this proﬁts expression comes from the consumers who participate in the comparison
site. These consumers click on ﬁrm i s product to get directed to ﬁrm i’s website when ﬁrm i is the
only advertising ﬁrm and consumers prefer product i over the outside option, or when ﬁrm j also
advertises its product but consumers prefer product i over product j and the outside option. The
consumers who do not register with the platform buy at random and therefore do not generate any
costs of clicks.
The formula for the proﬁts of the rival ﬁrm is similar. The utility consumers obtain when
they opt out of the platform is the same as equation (3), while the utility they get when they
register with the intermediary is the same as in equation (4). As we have done above, if ﬁrms mix







jo). If consumers mix between registering with the intermediary and opting out
it must be that u∗(1) = u∗(0).
23The platform’s proﬁts stem from consumer subscriptions and click-through traﬃc. Therefore,
Π=μs + μ(1 − (1 − αi)(1 − αj))c.
The following table shows that the behavior of the proﬁts function of the intermediary with click-
through fees is qualitatively similar to the one with ﬁxed fees. Suppose ﬁrms and consumers opt out
with strictly positive probability. Then, for a given click-through fee, the intermediary can increase
the consumer subscription fee and obtain a greater proﬁt. Likewise, for a given subscription fee, the
intermediary can increase the consumer subscription fee and increase beneﬁts. As a result, ﬁrms
and consumers must all participate surely.
kcs p ∗ αμ π ∗ u∗ Π
0.200 0.500 0.050 1.763 0.655 0.595 0.115 0.983 0.292
0.200 0.500 0.100 1.759 0.727 0.608 0.111 0.979 0.342
0.200 0.500 0.150 1.755 0.801 0.622 0.107 0.975 0.392
0.200 0.600 0.150 1.824 0.817 0.668 0.094 0.957 0.488
0.200 0.800 0.150 1.985 0.855 0.771 0.065 0.914 0.720
0.200 1.000 0.175 2.179 0.940 0.891 0.031 0.856 1.044
0.200 1.186 0.182 2.386 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.800 1.369
Notes: The quality parameter δ is set to 1.
Table 8: Model with horizontally diﬀerentiated products and CPC
3.2.2 Vertical product diﬀerentiation
We now consider the case in which ﬁrms sell products that are also vertically diﬀerentiated. Without
loss of generality we normalize ﬁrm j’s quality level to zero and assume ﬁrm i oﬀers higher quality
than ﬁrm j,t h a ti s ,δi >δ j =0 .
We ﬁrst hypothesize that at the equilibrium fees a and s, consumers participate with probability
less than one, so μ<1. Moreover, for large enough diﬀerences in quality, the high quality ﬁrm i
participates with probability one and ﬁrm j participates with probability less than one, so αi =1












Since we are assuming the intermediary has to charge the same fee a to both ﬁrms, such an
equilibrium could arise if the intermediary sets her fees such that the low quality ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between participating or not participating—for large enough diﬀerences in quality this implies that
24the high quality ﬁrm will always obtain higher proﬁts by advertising on the comparison site than
by selling to the non-participating consumers. From these equations we can obtain the equilibrium
participation probabilities (αj,μ).
asp i pj αi αj μπ i πj u Π W
0.100 0.150 1.556 1.242 1.000 0.281 0.520 0.454 0.134 0.928 0.206 1.722
0.100 0.200 1.544 1.241 1.000 0.573 0.522 0.441 0.133 0.931 0.262 1.767
0.100 0.250 1.531 1.241 1.000 0.868 0.524 0.427 0.132 0.934 0.318 1.813
0.100 0.272 1.525 1.241 1.000 1.000 0.525 0.421 0.132 0.937 0.343 1.833
0.150 0.272 1.501 1.214 1.000 0.974 0.792 0.348 0.058 0.944 0.512 1.862
0.188 0.272 1.481 1.188 1.000 0.952 0.988 0.293 0.000 0.950 0.639 1.882
0.188 0.281 1.476 1.188 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.288 0.000 0.952 0.657 1.897
0.567 -0.122 1.567 1.193 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.148 0.445 1.594
Notes: The quality parameter δi is set to 1, while δj =0 .
Table 9: Model with vertical product diﬀerentiation (Δ = 1)
Table 9 shows the behavior of ﬁrm and user participation rates and the proﬁts of the interme-
diary when the quality diﬀerence Δ = δi − δj = 1. Starting from a relatively low level of a and s,
an increase in s increases both consumer and ﬁrm participation. As a result, the intermediary will
continue to increase s till αj is one. From that point onwards, an increase in the ﬁrms’ fee increases
the user participation rate and lowers the participation of ﬁrm j so the intermediary again ﬁnds
it proﬁtable to raise the consumer fees. This process continues until ﬁrm j and the consumers all
participate with probability one. The intermediary maximizes its proﬁt at a =0 .188 and s =0 .281.
So far we have looked at an equilibrium in which the fees are set such that both ﬁrms will
participate. However, the intermediary could also set its fees such that only the high quality ﬁrm












The last line of Table 9 shows that if the intermediary sets her fees such that only the high
quality ﬁrm participates, proﬁts are lower than if it lets the two ﬁrms participate. Nevertheless,
for relatively large diﬀerences in quality it might be the case that the intermediary prefers only
the highly quality ﬁrm to advertise on its website. For instance, when Δ = 3 the comparison
site maximizes proﬁts by setting a and s in such a way that ﬁrm j does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
advertise on the platform, while ﬁrm i participates with probability one. This can be seen in Table
10 where we describe the behavior of ﬁrm and consumer decisions and the implications for the
comparison site’s proﬁts for Δ = 3. As shown in the table, since the high quality ﬁrm is the only
25ﬁrm active at the comparison site, for all a and s the price found on the intermediary will be the
same. Starting from relatively low fee levels a higher s leaves the participation rate of the consumers
unchanged—αi is changed in such way to keep consumers indiﬀerent between participating and not
participating. Increasing a leads to higher participation of the consumers, and as such to higher
proﬁts for the intermediary. As shown in the table the intermediary maximizes her proﬁts when
a =1 .557 and s =0 .347 (in bold). Comparing the last two lines of this table shows that in this case
setting a relatively low a such that both ﬁrms will participate will generate lower overall proﬁts
for the platform in comparison to setting a relatively high a such that only the high quality ﬁrm
participates. However, as shown by the last column of Table 10 welfare W is higher when everyone
participates.
asp i pj αi αj μπ i πj u Π W
1.000 0.100 2.557 1.234 0.737 0.000 0.642 0.557 0.100 1.169 0.802 2.628
1.000 0.200 2.557 1.225 0.844 0.000 0.642 0.557 0.100 1.169 0.972 2.799
1.000 0.300 2.557 1.215 0.950 0.000 0.642 0.557 0.100 1.169 1.143 2.969
1.000 0.347 2.557 1.210 1.000 0.000 0.642 0.557 0.100 1.169 1.223 3.050
1.300 0.347 2.557 1.172 1.000 0.000 0.835 0.257 0.046 1.169 1.590 3.063
1.500 0.347 2.557 1.138 1.000 0.000 0.963 0.057 0.010 1.169 1.835 3.072
1.557 0.347 2.557 1.127 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.169 1.905 3.074
0.115 0.490 2.388 1.115 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.273 0.000 1.241 0.720 3.235
Notes: The quality parameter δi is set to 3, while δj =0 .
Table 10: Model with vertical product diﬀerentiation (Δ = 3)
4 Concluding remarks and open research lines
The emergence of Internet shopbots and their implications for price competition, product diﬀer-
entiation, and market eﬃciency have been the focus of this paper. We have asked a number of
questions. How can a comparison site create value for consumers? Do ﬁrms have incentives to be
listed in comparison sites? Under which conditions are prices listed in these sites dispersed? Do
comparison sites enhance social welfare? Can comparison sites generate eﬃcient allocations?
To answer these questions we have developed a simple model of a comparison site. The interme-
diary platform tries to attract (possibly vertically and horizontally diﬀerentiated) online retailers
and consumers. The analysis of the model has revealed that product diﬀerentiation and price dis-
crimination play a critical role. For the case of homogeneous product sellers (Baye and Morgan,
2001), if the online retailers cannot charge diﬀerent on- and oﬀ-the-comparison-site prices, then
the comparison site has incentives to charge fees so high that some ﬁrms are excluded. The fact
that some ﬁrms are excluded generates price dispersion, which creates value for consumers. This
value, in turn, can be extracted by the comparison site via consumer participation fees. The market
26allocation is not eﬃcient since products are sold at prices that exceed marginal cost. By contrast,
when on- and oﬀ-the-comparison-site prices can be diﬀerent, the comparison site has an incentive
to lure all the players to the site, which generates an allocation that is eﬃcient.
When online retailers sell products that are horizontally diﬀerentiated, the comparison site
creates value for consumers by aggregating product information. In this way, the comparison site
easily becomes a more attractive marketplace than the decentralized one (Galeotti and Moraga-
Gonz´ alez, 2009). In equilibrium, even if ﬁrms cannot price discriminate the comparison site attracts
all the players to the platform and an eﬃcient outcome ensues.
Allowing for vertical product diﬀerentiation brings interesting additional insights. The platform
faces the following trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, it can attract high and low quality producers to the
platform so as to increase competition, aggregate information and generate rents for consumers that
are ultimately extracted via registration fees. Alternatively, the comparison site can set advertising
fees that are so high that low quality sellers are excluded, thereby creating value for the top sellers.
When quality diﬀerences are large, the latter strategy pays oﬀ. The comparison site excludes
low quality from the platform, and grants higher rents for advertising sellers. Part of these rents
are ultimately extracted by the comparison site. Some value for consumers is destroyed and the
resulting allocation is ineﬃcient.
Along the way, we have kept things simple and therefore left aside important issues. One
important assumption has been that ﬁrms and consumers could only use a single platform as
an alternative to the search market. In practise, multiple comparison sites exist and questions
about how they compete with one another and their sustainability in the long-run arise. Moreover,
if retailers are ex-ante diﬀerentiated, one aspect worth to investigate is whether they distribute
themselves across platforms randomly of else they are sorted in a top-own way across them. One
practice we observe in recent days is that retailers are given the possibility to obtain priority
positioning in comparison sites’ lists after paying an extra fee. Adding this choice variable to the
problem of the platform’s manager would probably complicate matters much. One way to address
this issue is to use the framework put forward in the literature on position auctions. Priority
positions could be auctioned as it is the case in search engines advertising. In this connection,
Xu, Chen and Whinston (2011) study a model where ﬁrms sell homogenous products and bid
for prominent list positions. They relate the extent of market competitiveness to willingness to
bid for prominent positions. Another realistic feature we have ignored throughout is incomplete
information. When quality is private information of the retailers, the problem of the platform is
how to screen out good from bad thereby creating value for consumers. For a mechanism design
27approach in the context of search engines to this problem see Gomes (2011). Finally, another
simplifying assumption has been that search costs are negligible within a platform. When searching
the products displayed in the price comparison site is still costly for consumers, platforms may have
incentives to manipulate the way the alternatives are presented, thereby inducing more search and
higher click turnover (see Hagiu and Jullien, 2011).
On the empirical side, much research remains to be done. In fact, not much is yet known
about the extent to which theoretical predictions are in line with the data, especially in settings
where product diﬀerentiation is important. Comparison sites can potentially provide a wealth
of data. Detailed data from comparison sites may be helpful to learn how exactly consumers
search for products. Some consumers might sort by price, while others may sort by quality ratings
or availability. This type of information may give ﬁrms indications about the best way to to
present their product lists. Click-through data can facilitate the estimation of structural models
of demand. Finally, using data from bids for prominent positions may be a useful way to estimate
the characteristics of the supply side of the market.
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